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ABSTRACT
Il existe une litte´rature foisonnante au sujet de l’anonymisation
de donne´es par ge´ne´ralisation des valeurs d’enregistrement.
Les contributions portent soit sur le mode`le de ge´ne´ralisa-
tion, enrichissant le K-anonymat de L. Sweeney, soit sur un
algorithme de calcul d’une version anonymise´e d’un jeu de
donne´es, e´tant entendu qu’il a e´te´ prouve´ que le proble`me est
NP-difficile, et donc que la plupart des algorithmes offrent
des solutions approche´es.
Les me´thodes d’acce`s spatiales (MAS), bien e´tudie´es dans
le champ des bases de donne´es, suscitent un inte´reˆt gran-
dissant dans le contexte de l’anonymisation de donne´es par
ge´ne´ralisation des valeurs d’enregistrements, e´tant donne´es
(i) leur capacite´ a` atteindre des grandeurs d’e´chelle ine´gale´es
par d’autres approches, et (ii) l’ade´quation du format des
entre´es de l’index avec les donne´es anonymise´es.
Nous proposons dans cette communication un e´tat des lieux
et une analyse critique des MASs e´tudie´es sous l’angle de
l’anonymisation de donne´es. Nous e´valuons les propositions
existantes et sugge´rons des pistes de travail encore non ex-
plore´es a` ce jour.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Information Systems]: Database Management—
Database applications; E.1 [Data]: Data Structures
General Terms
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
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Anonymization, Spatial Indexing, Point Access Method
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
APVP ’2011 Toulouse, France
As stated by Jim Gray [11], we are entering the fourth age of
science defined by a new paradigm where data play a central
role in the production of science and innovation. To achieve
that bright vision, scientific data must be unleashed from
private repositories, and publicly released for the all research
community. The Open Access movement, first concentrated
on free access to scientific publications, turns now to Open
Data initiative. In the same time, new business models have
emerged to offer valuable services and take benefits from
open data.
Then, organizations are strongly encouraged to release their
micro-data to support data analysis, to provide new business
opportunities and to allow every kind of scientific study and
to support data journalism as well. For example, patients’
medical records may be released by a clinic to support med-
ical research and epidemiological studies.
However, releasing medical records about individuals vio-
lates their privacy thus, Privacy-Preserving Data Publish-
ing (PPDP) has become a critical issue for companies and
organizations. To obviate identity disclosure, many orga-
nizations usually remove the uniquely identifying informa-
tion like name, SSN or IP address from the public release.
However, as stated first by Latanya Sweeney in [23], ob-
serving a 30-year tradition of inference problem in statisti-
cal databases, this sanitization of data might not be helpful
in keeping the secrecy of given individuals since several at-
tributes, coined quasi-identifiers, if they are put together,
could surely lead to identity disclosure.
1.2 Preliminaries
This gave rise to the need for robust sanitization meth-
ods to publish sensitive individual data keeping their pri-
vacy intact. The seminal K-anonymization paradigm [23]
was proposed to achieve this goal by means of a gener-
alization model. Basically, anonymization based on gen-
eralization consists in decreasing accuracy of values from
quasi-identifiers. For instance, 44100 Zip code would be-
come 44XXX and 70 pounds would be said to range be-
tween 50 and 80 pounds. More precisely, a table satisfies
K-anonymity if every record is indistinguishable on quasi-
identifiers from at least K − 1 other records. This indistin-
guishability principle supports an equivalence relationship
on the records of an anonymous public release and prevents
from identity disclosure of individuals with a probability of
Id Age Zipcode Gender Disease
(1) [48−62] (62) 441XX (44120) * (F) Flu
(2) [48−62] (51) 441XX (44190) * (M) Flu
(3) [48−62] (48) 441XX (44100) * (M) HIV
(4) [59−77] (59) 444XX (44470) * (F) Flu
(5) [59−77] (77) 444XX (44420) * (M) Gastritis
(6) [59−77] (66) 444XX (44420) * (M) HIV
Table 1: Example of a 3-Anonymous Public Release
(with raw values into bracket).
1/K.
Table 1 provides a toy example of a public release of 6 med-
ical records following 3-anonymity, i.e. each public record
is identical on quasi-identifiers (Age, Zip and Gender) with
at least 2 other records. For instance, records 1, 2, 3 from
Table 1 belongs to the same equivalence class and are in-
distinguishable one with each other. Pattern of the class is
(Age=[48−62], Zip=441XX, Gender=*). Similarly, records
4, 5, 6 form the second equivalence class.
1.3 Typical Use Case
Public release supports exploration, analysis and scientific
studies. The very first and popular processing of public re-
lease is then to search and filter tabular data by the way of
point queries and window queries. Indeed, regular database
records can be geometrically interpreted as points in a multi-
dimensional space where each dimension is a column of the
raw table. Point coordinates are then defined by attribute
values. Transformation is obvious for numerical and ordinal
variables. Categorical variables could also be equipped with
a total ordering, except that without any “native” ordering,
the process is driven by the application domain and back-
ground knowledge.Thus database queries are transformed
into queries against a set of points.
Translated to anonymous public releases, sanitized records
become hyperrectangles in a multi-dimensional space, where
each dimension is a field in the set of quasi-identifiers. For
instance, sanitized records from Table 1 are cuboids in the 3-
dimensional space (Age, Zipcode, Gender) as shown by Fig-
ure 1. As a point query example Q1, user would filter data to
retrieve possible patient’s record designated by Age=62 AND
Zip:=441201 AND Gender:=F2 and she would be returned the
answer set {1, 2, 3} from Table 1. Similarly, an example of
a window query Q2 would yield to searching for patient’s
records satisfying Zip IN [4442X,4447X] AND Age>=50 AND
Gender=*. It would then return the set {4, 5, 6}.
To achieve such querying scenario, anonymous records are
mutually disjoint spatial objects with a rectangular extent
and window queries are orthogonal range queries. And any
record that overlaps/lies within query region is a member
of the result set. There exist many efficient algorithms
and data structures [1] to compute such orthogonal range
queries against the spatial representation of the anonymous
database. Furthermore, since any orthogonal range query
1Expand the query to Zip=44120 OR Zip=4412X OR
Zip=441XX OR Zip=44XXX OR Zip=4XXXX OR Zip=*.
2Expand the query to Gender=F OR Gender=*.
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Figure 1: 3D spatial representation of the anony-
mous public release from Table 1 with point query
Q1 and window query Q2.
can be decomposed into a collection of 1-dimensional range
queries, it is then easy to manage filters on the tabular repre-
sentation of the public release within a basic spreadsheet or
web-client technologies as well. Query Q2 over Table 1 gives
an example of such straightforward decomposition. Those
practical features are very useful in lots of iterative explo-
ration processes that would support analysis and scientific
studies. Then, we argue that the axis-parallel rectangular
coding of anonymous records is a strong requirement for a
generic PPDP task.
Other kinds of range queries are defined by the shape of
query region: sphere, half-space, simplex, polytope. Sphere
range queries, so-called nearest-neighbor queries have been
extensively studied and there also exist efficient algorithms
to compute such popular queries especially on rectangu-
lar objects. However, none of these range queries satisfies
the decomposition property that makes anonymous releases
human-friend under tabular representation.
1.4 Summary of the Requirements for PPDP
To sum-up the above discussion, we argue that every generic
PPDP task should meet at least the following theoretical
and practical requirements in order to be valuable for the
end-user:
1. Indistinguishability principle — to ensureK-anonymity;
2. Mutually disjoint equivalence classes — to preserve
quality of the anonymous public release;
3. Multidimensional point partitioning— to support point
and range queries on the anonymous public release;
4. Hyperrectangular coding of equivalence classes — to
allow decomposition of orthogonal range queries.
1.5 To follow-on
Section 2 reviews existing structures that support anonymiza-
tion algorithms, and it presents features of the main logical
structures eligible for a PPDP task. Next, Section 3 fo-
cuses on a special kind of those structures, so-called nested
hyperrectangle-based bucketed point access methods, that have
very nice features for the anonymization. Definition and
searching strategies for such structures are provided. Then,
Section 4 states several open issues to address in order to ac-
commodate and optimize the index structures to the PPDP
task.
2. POINT ACCESS METHODS
Point Access Methods (PAMs) are logical structures that
organize a set of point for efficient searching. We will see
in this section that PAMs have features that are suitable
for the anonymization problem, and as such, we argue in
the following that they are the preferred data structures to
support K-anonymization algorithms.
2.1 Point Partitioning for PPDP
It is worth to notice that public release with one single equiv-
alence class described on each dimension by the all domain
is obviously K-anonymous (K ≤ n the number of records)
but it is definitely useless for the end-user. Thus, the main
challenge of K-anonymization is to compute a public re-
lease where the information loss has been minimized, in the
sense of a general criteria such like certainty metric [25],
discernibility penalty [3] or KL- divergence [13] for the most
popular ones. This optimization problem was proved to be
NP-hard [18].
Hence, many approximation algorithms have been proposed
in the literature since the seminal work of L. Sweeney [22].
Usually, Mondrian approach [15] is thought as the base-
line algorithm since it has the basic good properties we
could expect from such algorithms: local recoding and multi-
dimensional partitioning. Mondrian iteratively operates a
binary partitioning of the data space until every block con-
tains between K and 2K − 1 points. Actually, Mondrian
builds a kd-tree over the raw data and publishes bounding
boxes of the leaves as equivalence classes of the anonymous
release. Construction has time complexity O(N · logN),
where N is the number of records in raw data.
Following the geometric representation of the data, Iwuchukwu
et al. [12] propose to use a bulk-loading implementation of an
R+-tree, one of the most popular spatial access methods for
databases, to compute the K-anonymous release. It outper-
forms Mondrian thanks to buffering and efficient bottom-up
index construction algorithm, and it scales up to very large
data sets. Furthermore, the hierarchical structure of the
R+-tree natively supports (BℓK)-anonymity for all level ℓ
in the tree, with B the fanout parameter. And with an or-
dered leaf scan, it could support (cK)-anonymity as well, for
all c in N. Time complexity remains in O(N · logN). And
I/O cost for external computation is in O(N/B · logN/B).
Since the R+-tree bulk-loading algorithm is applied on a set
of points rather than a set of spatial objects with an ex-
tent, it is actually a variant of a kd-B-tree structure where
hyperrectangles have been shrinked to the minimum bound-
ing boxes (MBB) of the subset of points in each equivalence
class. Remind that a kd-B-tree is a bucket-oriented variant
of a kd-tree where the fanout of each node is defined by pa-
rameter B that usually fits the disk block size. The many
good features of the R+-tree approach makes it therefore
the reference algorithm for K-anonymization until now.
Many works also proposed point partitioning structures in
low dimension (2-3D) for privacy preserving location-based
queries [10, 9, 19, 6]. In this application domain, privacy
is related to instant location of users and queries as well.
Popular approaches design an anonymizer that dynamically
provides a Cloaking Region to the Location-Based Service.
For that purpose, Gruteser et al. [10] implements a kd-tree,
whereas Mokbel et al. [19] uses a variant of a PR quad-
tree in Casper. Ghinita et al. [9] accommodate partitioning
structures from kd-tree and R-tree to hash a database of
Points Of Interest (POI) and answer approximate nearest-
neighbor queries in a Privacy Information Retrieval (PIR)
approach. They also consider Hilbert space filling curves
to map 2D points to single-dimensional data structures like
B+-trees to index POIs. Actually, they argue that their PIR
approach is independent from the partitioning structure as
far as it provides at most
√
N buckets within up to
√
N
POIs each. Other work [14] focused on geo-privacy in the
sense of privacy-preserving location data publishing. In this
context, a space filling curve was also employed to order
both data points and POIs on the map. Quad-trees and
space filling curves do not scale for higher dimensions, and
the latter cannot guarantee non overlapping bounding boxes
in the worse case.
The above short review states that every approach to geo-
privacy accommodates in memory and implements well-known
structure for multi-dimensional point data partitioning.
K-anonymity were also studied from the cardinality con-
straint clustering point of view. On the one hand, anonymiza-
tion algorithms were proposed [4, 5, 2] that achieve good
quality, whereas neither they scale up in the size of the data
set, nor they meet the basic orthogonal range query require-
ment since patterns are spheres (centers and radius) of each
cluster. On the other hand, many grid clustering techniques
([24, 20] for a short excerpt) have been proposed. However,
none of them are as fast and scalable as Point Access Meth-
ods (PAM) since external storage support and dedicated
insert-delete-search operations are missing. Then, PAMs re-
main the preferred logical structures for the anonymization
of very large data sets.
2.2 Comparative Analysis of PAMs
For an insight into multi-dimensional Point Access Methods,
the reader is strongly invited to refer to the first chapter
of [21]. In Table 2, we present a short comparison between
the most popular PAMs that could be of interest for PPDP
task. For the sake of simplicity, we omit the multiple exten-
sions of each structure, available in the literature, since the
main criteria of our comparison are inherent to each struc-
ture such that they remain valid whenever the extension.
Criteria are as follows:
• bucket? — decides whether the PAM is bucketed or
not, i.e. each element of the logical structure has a
parametrized size rather than a fixed-length size. Bucket
PAMs are those that could be used as spatial indices
for databases since the bucket size B is set to the disk
page size and then, the I/O cost of such structures is
controlled. Those structures are external or secondary
storage structures and then, they can grow as much
as the size of the data set requires to, without main
memory limitations;
bucket? orientation shape grid? done
kd-tree No top-down HR No X
kd-trie No top-down HR Yes X
BD-tree No top-down NHR No −
BSP tree No top-down CP No ×
PR quadtree No top-down HR Yes X
kd-B-tree Yes top-down HR No −
kd-B-trie Yes top-down HR Yes −
Grid file Yes top-down HR Yes −
R+-tree Yes bottom-up HR No X
hB-tree Yes top-down NHR No −
BV -tree Yes bottom-up NHR No −
BANG file Yes top-down NHR Yes −
Table 2: Comparison of index structures for multi-
dimensional point data. HR stands for HyperRect-
angle, NHR is Nested HR, CP means Convex Poly-
tope.
• orientation — separates PAMs into 2 categories: those
that decompose the underlying space, and those that
aggregate the data points. The former are top-down
since they iteratively divide the space to build the
blocks, and the latter are bottom-up since they operate
from the data to the blocks;
• shape — blocks of the partitioning could have various
shapes in the space. The most simple but popular one
is the hyperrectangle (HR);
• grid? — decides whether pre-defined scales support
the PAM or not, such that every partition line follows
a grid in the space. PAMs with such feature adopt
regular decomposition.
• done — already used into an anonymization approach?
(see Section 2.1 above for a review).
The 5 first raws of Table 2 refer to in memory structures.
Except the BSP tree, all of them build (nested) hyperrect-
angular ((N)HR) blocks, thus they meet the PPDP require-
ments as stated in Section 1.4. The NHR property will be
discussed further in Section 3.1. The BSP tree builds con-
vex polytopes that do not allow to decompose orthogonal
range queries then it is not eligible for a PPDP task. The
only BD-tree, that builds nested HRs, has not already been
support of an anonymization process.
The all remaining raws are Bucketed PAMs (BPAMs) that
is, indexing structures for point databases. Among them,
the 4 first structures generate HR blocks, whereas the 3 last
ones provide nested HRs. The only R+-tree was used for
PPDP until now.
Moreover, we argue that bottom-up spatial indexing is not
systematically more efficient than top-down approaches as
opposed to the conjecture from [12]. This result is given
by our own experiments comparing in the same running en-
vironment R+-tree approach (bottom-up) with the BANG
file (top-down). Following usual analysis on spatial access
methods, we claim that the performance is mainly depen-
dent from the splitting strategy. In the BANG file, we use
regular decomposition following the grid whereas the origi-
nal R+-tree grows by means of a quadratic procedure com-
paring pairwise distances of elements in an overflow bucket.
Those strategies determine a constant factor (w.r.t. N , the
number of points) in time complexity that makes the execu-
tion time slower for the R+-tree. Hence, both top-down and
bottom-up approaches deserve to be studied in the context
of PPDP.
Finally, the grid-based PAMs have the ability to support
background knowledge in the space decomposition process
by means of dimensional scales. Consequences are multiple.
First, the block splitting strategy is straightforward since
scales have been pre-defined over each dimension, so that
the algorithm performs very well. Second, the lowest K
value is given by the density of the finest regions in the grid.
Hence the user controls the privacy requirement by means of
the grid resolution rather than a parameter K. Obviously,
grid resolution could be adapted to match a given K value
when needed.
2.3 Focus on Bucketed PAMs
Bucketed PAMs (BPAMs) are well-suited for the anonymiza-
tion task. The very first reason is that BPAMs fulfill the
basic requirements for PPDP as stated in Section 1.4. But
BPAMs have many other nice features that could be of in-
terest in the context of PPDP. First, since they support
spatial indexing techniques in databases, they leverage 30-
years research and experience in effective and efficient multi-
dimensional partitioning data structures built from very large
data sets. Thus, they scale up and perform very well.
Next, BPAMs natively offer basic insert-delete-search oper-
ations that straightforwardly make the anonymization pro-
cess incremental. It then supports dynamic updates of the
dataset before the generation of the anonymous public re-
lease, and it provides a framework to study the open issue
of continuous publication.
Moreover, BPAMs require a search operation to perform at
least in O(log n) to be efficient. Thus, they all develop a
hierarchical structure, so-called tree directory, that makes
possible multi-granular anonymization with partitioning ex-
traction at any level in the tree. The only exception would
be the Grid file that performs in O(1) such like linear hash-
ing, having the main drawback of a low filling rate in each
block and a large and sparse directory.
3. NESTED HYPERRECTANGLES
We focus in this section on a category of BPAMs: those with
nested hyperrectangle blocks. We first present their features
and then we discuss about open issues such that they could
effectively support PPDP tasks.
3.1 Features of NHR-based BPAMs
We argue that. . .
. . .NHR-based BPAMs are the most sophisticated
and suitable logical structures to support PPDP
tasks.
Figure 2: Low quality binary partitioning of a set
of 6 points into blocks of at least 3 points, following
either (a) X-axis, or (b) Y-axis.
A B
Figure 3: NHR partitioning with cardinality con-
straint (≥ 3 points), (a) on points from Figure 2,
and (b) where HR partitioning fails.
NHR-based BPAMs operate an axis-parallel space partition-
ing by means of nested hyperrectangles rather than disjoint
hyperrectangles only. This singular feature allows to im-
prove expressive power of patterns compared to other HR-
based BPAMs. For example, given a set of 6 points in a
2-dimensional space, as shown on Figure 2; assume we are
trying to 3-anonymize the data set. Then, the alternative
HR partitionings are those drawn on Figure 2. It also pro-
vides the MBBs of each block as the R+-tree do. Similarly,
Figure 3 shows (a) the partition obtained by a NHR-based
BPAM for the same problem, and (b) a set of 6 points that
can even not be partitioned with a HR-based BPAM but
that can be divided within nested hyperrectangles.
Both pictures of Figure 3 show an outermost region A and a
nested region B. Space spanned into A−B forms one block,
denoted by [A], assigned to an equivalence class of the public
release, whereas points that lie into B are the second block
[B].
Hence, NHR-based BPAMs are known to better observe
clustered values into data and also to improve the filling rate
of each block since there are more flexibility in the space de-
composition as shown respectively on Part (a) and (b) of
Figure 3.
3.2 Point and Range Queries against NHRs
Remind that one of the PPDP requirements is to provide
user-friend descriptions of anonymous data set to ease point
and range searching in very simple but popular environments
such like spreadsheets. Remind that point queries and or-
thogonal range queries both have the property of being de-
composable into dimensional filters. HR-based BPAMs are
obviously tailored to fulfill such requirement. We argue that
A B
C
D E
F
G
Figure 4: Example of a 2D data space parti-
tioned with NHR-based BPAM into 7 nested regions
{A,B,C,D,E, F,G}.
Figure 5: Example of a sub-space spanned by a
range query on the partitioning of Figure 4.
anonymous public releases built with NHR-based BPAMs
could also support point and orthogonal range queries, with-
out disregarding quality and efficiency of the anonymization
process.
Then, we present a first attempt to resolve point and orthog-
onal range queries against NHRs within a tabular represen-
tation of anonymous records. To this end, each equivalence
class of the public release is encoded by its enclosing hyper-
rectangular region such that nested regions are allowed in
the table. And the partitioning level of each region is pro-
vided in an additional column. Hence, it becomes very easy
to process point queries in the anonymous table:
1. define filters on each dimension;
2. rank the intermediate result on decreasing region level;
3. keep only the records with the lowest value on the re-
gion level.
The above procedure works since the intermediate result
returns nested regions only, where the innermost region is
the right answer. Then, comparing levels suffices to remove
false positives that are enclosing regions. For instance, a
point query in block E on Figure 4 returns the intermediate
result set {(A, 0), (D, 1), (E, 2)}. Then, since levels are 0, 1,
2 resp. for A, D and E, the remaining block is E and the
answer of point query is the set of records from bucket [E]
assigned to region E.
Orthogonal range searching is slightly more difficult to man-
age. Indeed, if we follow the above point query process,
defining range filters rather than exact match filters, then
we are left with false negatives since enclosing regions could
be partly covered by the range query. At the contrary, if
we stop at step 2, then there could be false positives in the
answer set.
Then, we propose the following methodology to manually
perform orthogonal range searching in anonymous public re-
leases. The query is first decomposed into elementary range
queries that cover the entire query space with small cuboids
that correspond to the finest resolution of regions in the pub-
lic release. The resolution can be determined by means of
the highest level value. Obviously, the resolution depends
on the K value for a given public release. Then, each el-
ementary range query is performed in the same way than
point queries, except that filters on dimensions are ranges
rather than exact matching. Finally, the answer set is the
union of all the elementary range query results.
For instance, assume a range query Q that spans the sub-
space of A shown on Figure 5. Step 2 of point queries with
range filters returns the intermediate result set {(A, 0), (D, 1),
(E, 2), (G, 2)}, whereas step 3 gives {(E, 2), (G, 2)}. In the
former result set, (A, 0) is a false positive, and in the later re-
sult set, (D, 1) is a false negative. To fix this wrong behavior,
the above methodology for range searching first decomposes
the query into 3 elementary queries Q(1), Q(2) and Q(3) that
span respectively the sub-part of D, region E and region G.
Values of dimensional filters are given by the examination
of bounds in each column of the equivalence classes. Next,
Q(1) is computed as a point query (with range filters) and
gives the intermediate result set {(A, 0), (D, 1)}. Then the
answer is [D]. The process is repeated for Q(2) and Q(3) and
it returns resp. [E] and [G]. Union of the 3 result sets is the
answer to Q.
Obviously, the BPAM tree directory remains available for
very large data sets and could be used as a regular database
access method for any kind of range queries over the leaves
of the index structure (the M -anonymous release).
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Extension to other generalization models
K-anonymity is the very first generalization principle to
achieve sanitization of data. Its main purpose is to prevent
from identity disclosure. Other more sophisticated mod-
els have emerged in recent years to overcome shortcom-
ings of K-anonymity, especially the attribute disclosure risk.
Among the most popular generalization principles are ℓ-
diversity [17] and t-closeness [16].
As stated in [12] for the R+-tree, any BPAM would be able
to incorporate constraints from the definition of the various
existing generalization models in its anonymization process.
The only accommodation would be to redefine the assign-
ment and splitting strategies such that both resulting blocks
satisfy the generalization model. For instance, to make the
anonymous release ℓ-diverse, it requires that at least ℓ sen-
sitive values are “well represented” in each equivalence class.
Thus, the algorithm would incorporate checking on sensitive
values in its splitting decision to only create new ℓ-diverse
blocks from old ones. And it would add constraint on as-
signment of a new point into an existing block such that the
resulting block still satisfies the ℓ-diversity, otherwise the
algorithm would locally redistribute points into blocks.
Many other models of anonymization exist in the litera-
ture, such like the ε-differential privacy [7] to prevent from
probabilistic attacks, but they do not use generalization to
preserve privacy of records and they are far from practical
approaches for most of the current anonymization require-
ments in real-life. For a comprehensive review of anonymiza-
tion models and algorithms, the reader is invited to refer [8].
4.2 Compaction procedure
In [12], the authors propose a compaction procedure that
simply shrinks the envelop of each block to its MBB as shown
on Figure 2. Consequently, the average volume of the blocks
is minimized.
The R+-tree approach natively computes such MBBs for ev-
ery block. However, top-down NHR-based BPAMs operate
a decomposition of the space such that the union of all the
blocks spans the entire space. Obviously, a compaction of
each block would yield to a more accurate anonymous public
release, and would still increase its quality. Thus, it can be
considered as a straightforward improvement of top-down
NHR-based BPAMs, even if computation of non hyperrect-
angular “MBB”such like those on Figure 3 must be carefully
defined first.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this communication, we advocated the use of Bucketed
Point Access Methods for Privacy-Preserving Data Publish-
ing tasks. We focused on the K-anonymity generalization
model for data anonymization. We first reviewed the exist-
ing approaches based on multidimensional point partition-
ing. Then, we presented an almost comprehensive list of
PAMs eligible to the PPDP task. We argued that Nested
HyperRectangle-based BPAMs are the most promising struc-
tures to support PPDP. Then, we considered decomposable
point and range queries against tabular representation of
anonymous public releases, and we proposed a first attempt
to answer such queries. Finally, we discussed about obvious
extensions to various generalization models and compaction
of NHRs to Minimum Bounding Boxes.
As a follow-on of that study, there could be many tracks
to investigate. First, it is obvious that several instances
of NHR-based BPAMs must be implemented and compared
for K-anonymization. Next, extensions to other generaliza-
tion models could be experimented as well. Besides, the
development of a toolbox that supports search and analy-
sis of nested hyperrectangular anonymous records would be
highly valuable. Indeed, we argue that those shapes are the
most sophisticated ones that could be managed by regular
end-users. And finally, the definition of a compaction pro-
cedure for NHRs is also an interesting problem in the field
of computational geometry.
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